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I. Introduction 
In the  last two decades,  economists  have  been  trying to  unravel  the 
mystery of the slowdown  in productivity growth of the U.S.  economy.  Most  of 
the studies have  been  directed toward  the entire manufacturing or 
disaggregated manufacturing  sectors of the whole  country.  Hulten and  Schwab 
(1984)  (H-S)  were  the first to  study the decline in  productivity growth  from a 
regional  perspective.  They  have  found  that decline of  productivity growth  in 
the Snowbelt  is  not more  apparent  than in the Sunbelt.  The  H-S  finding 
rejects arguments  of some  economists  that the efficiency of the Snowbelt 
economy  is declining more  rapidly than its southern  counterpart.  Therefore, 
change  in  efficiency (measured  as  the index  of total factor productivity) does 
not explain a regional  shift of the industrial  sector.  The  H-S  study  was 
based  on  the entire manufacturing sector.  The  analysis of the disaggregated 
industrial  sector may  reveal  more  fully the  sources of a regional  shift. 
This  paper  presents  a regional  analysis of the  steel  industry.  The  major 
change  in the geographical  distribution of steel-producing facilities is due 
to the development  of the so-called minimill.  Three  aspects  of the economic 
performance  of  minimills and  integrated mills are considered  in this paper: 
technology,  price mechanism,  and  efficiency. 
Development  of electric-arc furnace  technology allowed small  mills to 
compete  with integrated mills and  gave  birth to  a new  organizational 
entity--the minimill,  which operates on  a different price mechanism.  To 
clarify theoretical differences in  price mechanisms  in the steel  industry, 
minimills are treated as  small  Marshallian firms,  and  integrated mills are 
treated as  oligopolistic firms.  However,  because  empirical  data on  minimill prices are  scarce,  support for the theoretical  arguments  on price differences 
is drawn  from the steel  industry and  from other industries as  well. 
The  efficiency difference between  minimills and  integrated mills is  based 
on  the observation of  regions  where  either minimills or integrated mills 
predominate.  Direct observations of individual  firms were  not available.  The 
results of  this study indicate that states with growing  numbers  of  minimills 
did not gain efficiency relative to  states where  integrated mills 
predominated.  These  findings  are consistent with those of H-S  study for total 
manufacturing,  in  which it  is  argued  that efficiency indicators are not 
sufficient to  describe regional  differences.  As  opposed  to  aggregated 
manufacturing,  several  features of the steel  industry clearly describe 
regional  differences.  These  features are technological  and  organizational  and 
are reflected by  the growth of  minimills in  one  set of  regions and  the decline 
of  integrated mills in  another  set of  regions. 
Section I1  gives a brief  history of the regional  development  of  the steel 
industry.  This  is  followed,  in  section 111,  by a description of  recent 
changes  in the industry--namely,  the opening of  minimi  11s.  Section IV 
describes  the differences  in  price mechanisms  of integrated mills and 
minimills.  A comparative inter-regional efficiency analysis,  based  on  total 
factor productivity (TFP)  analysis,  of  states with integrated mills and  states 
with minimills is  presented  in  section V.  Findings  are summarized  in the 
conclusion;  data sources  are presented  in  appendix I. 
11.  Regional  Development History of  the Steel  Industry. 
During most of this century,  steel  producers  have  been  concentrated  in 
just four states:  Illinois, Indiana,  Ohio,  and Pennsylvania.  This four-state 
region is  referred to  here as  the Midwest Core  (MWC).  At no time  since 1910 
has  MWC1s share of raw steel  production fallen below 60  percent of total U.S. 
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declined,  while new  regions have  emerged  in the steel production arena.  In 
the last two decades,  the South's  share of steel production has  steadily 
increased from 10  percent in  1960  to 17  percent in  1985--the fastest growing 
share  among  steel-producing regions.  The  share  of the Atlantic Coast  states 
during the same  period declined from 12  percent  to  6 percent.  The  regional 
structural  change  in the last two decades  is  more  dramatic with respect  to 
mill openings  in  states that were  not involved in  raw steel production 
previously.  Ten  new  states were  added  to  the list  of steel-producing states 
compiled by the American  Iron and  Steel  Institute (AISI)  since 1954,  while in 
the previous 40  years,  only nine states were  added  (see  table  1).  These 
developments  are typical of the Snowbelt/Sunbelt  manufacturing shift, but this 
study focuses on a particular industrial sector.  In  this setting,  in  addition 
to  analyzing productivity trends,  we  can  address  the industrial organization 
issues of the industry.  Industrial organization analysis devoted to 
differences between  minimills and  integrated mills explains the regional 
shift. 
Minimills,  which first  appeared  in  the late 1950s  and  have  become 
established in the last two decades,  process  scrap  steel  with an  electric-arc 
furnace.  Minimills are small-scale producers,  with 100,000  tons of average 
annual  capacity.  Before the advent of  minimills,  most  steel producers  were 
fully integrated,  large corporations  and  had  blast furnaces  with an  average 
annual  capacity of  2  million tons.  Because  integrated mills have  not expanded 
their facilities in  the last two  decades,  the major  factor in  regional  changes 
in  the steel  industry is  distribution of  minimills and  reduced capacity of 
integrated mills.  A map  of the minimills reveals a fairly even  distribution 
of  facilities over  the country (see  figure  1). 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper
Best available copyChart 1  Raw Steel  Production 
(production  as  a  share  of U.S.  total) 
Percent 
9  0 
80 - 





30  -  Rest of  U.S.  ,* 
/',/ 
F0 
A/---'  --,'-'.-I  /-.  *' 
20 -  e 
-,-.0--,' 
c I' 
/-\  ,\,;-\-I  , 
Atlantic Coast 
SOURCE:  American  Iron and  Steel  Institute,  Annual  Statistical Report,  1910  to 
1984,  Washington,  DC. 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper
Best available copyStates 
A1 aska 
TABLE  1:  Attrition and  Addition of States  to 
AISI List of Steel  Production 
Arkansas 
Arizona 
Washington,  DC 
Florida 
Hawai i 
Kansas  - 




Nebraska  + 
Nevada 
North Carolina  +  - 
Oregon  + 
South Carol i  na  +  - 
Utah  -  + 
Wisconsin  - 
Total Addition 
Total Attrition 
KEY  :  +  State added  to 1  ist 
-  State deleted  f roll)  1 i  st 
Source:  Annual  Statistical  Re~ort,  American  Iron and  Steel  Institute 1914-1975,  Washinyton,  DC 
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(in thousands  of tons) 
SOURCE:  Table  2 
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North Central  region,  and  7.7  percent of capacity is in the Northeast region. 
The  greatest  share of total minimill capacity (57.8  percent)  is in  the South, 
and  10 percent  is in  the West.  (These  figures are calculated from table 2, 
which  reflects the distribution of steel-producing capacities  in 1983.) 
Integrated mills have  historically been  concentrated in the MWC,  while 
minimi  11s  have  spread  all over  the country. '  As  a result,  an  analysis of 
output distribution,  or new  openings,  creates  the impression that the steel 
industry is  moving  to  the South.  It  is  clear that searching for particular 
features that make  the South attractive to the steel  industry (such  as  rising 
productivity or relatively falling factors costs)  is not useful. 
111.  Technological  Differences Between  Minimills and  Integrated Mills 
Prior to  the 119-day  steelworkers'  strike in  1959,  the share of  minimills 
in the  steel  industry was  very small  but,  in  the last 20 years,  they have 
become  a strong competitor of the  integrated steel producers.  Small-scale 
steel  operations  are not new;  several  such  steel mills have  been  in  operation 
for  50 years or  more  (see  Kotch  [19711).  In the past,  these  mills were  built 
either to support an  existing plant or were  intended  to  develop into a large 
corporation.  By  contrast,  the purpose  of the minimill is:  a> to  build 
small-capacity facilities that remain relatively small,  b)  to  compete  with 
large integrated mills by  adopting lower  capital cost technologies,  and  c)  to 
specialize in  producing a special  type of steel  that large mills produce  less 
efficiently. 
More  than  40  minimills were  built in  the  1960s,  and  20 were  built in the 
1970s  (see  table 2).  The  average  capacity of individul minimills has 
increased  since  their start.  In the  1960s,  individual minimills did not 
exceed  40,000  tons of  annual  steel  production. 
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Capac i  ty
d 
Mi  nimi  11  s  Integrated 
Number  of plants 
Start-up dates of  minimills  Total  plants 
pre-60s  60s  -  70s  80s  Minimills  Integrated 
2  2  6 
2  1  3  6 
2  2  2 
2  2  6 
1  1  2 
1  1  2  1 
1  1  2 
1 
1  1  3 
1  1  2 
1  2  3  1 
1  1  1  3 
2  1  3 
3  2  3  8  2 
1  2  3 
1  1 
1  1 
1 
1  1 
1  1  1 
1  1  2 
1  1 
1  1 
2  2 
2  1  1  4 
1  1 
1 
1  1 
1  1 
1  1  1 
1  1 
1  1 
Total  17,784  129,500  20  13  14  10  57  3  4 
Total  number  of companies  4  5  16 
a.  Capacity  is  expressed  in  100  tons per year. 
NOTE:  Data  for  13  minimills that did not appear  in  The  Minimill Handbook  were 
supplemented  by phone  interviews. 
Sources:  Minimill Data:  33  Metal  Producing  (1983);  Marketing Economics  Institute; 
and  Serjeantson et  al.  (1983).  Integrated mill data:  Acs  (1984). 
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compared to 2 million tons per year for the average blast furnace operation 
(see  McManus C19701).  Total  minimill  capacity tripled in the 1970s,  reaching 
17,000,000 tons a year, and capturing about 20 percent of the steel 
marketplace  (see  33 Metal  Producing C19831). 
The product range of  minimills has remained relatively narrow.  Minimills 
produce mostly rounds, angles, channels,  flats, rods, and curves used in 
construction and light manufacturing  (see  McManus C19801).  The integrated 
mills are geared toward large construction projects--dams, railroads, bridges, 
and automobiles.  Although in the 1960s minimills were associated with 
low-grade products that did not require sophisticated equipment, this is 
gradually becoming less true.  Today, minimills are moving into the mainstream 
of steelmaking, as they have exhausted market potential  in low-grade products 
and are exploring new technologies  (see  Iverson  C19841). 
Minimills use scrap metal, which is processed in an electric-arc furnace, 
a technology that enables producers to bypass coke ovens and blast furnaces, 
which are parts of the integrated process.  This technology cuts the sunk cost 
of minimill construction, lowers energy consumption per ton of steel, and 
reduces pollution-abatement costs.  In 1978, integrated producers used 35.2 
million Btus to produce a ton of shipped steel, while the non-integrated 
producers used 9.9 million Btus to make the same amount.  While the integrated 
sector uses about 10  man-hours to produce one ton of finished steel, minimills 
use about three man-hours per ton.  A scrap-based electric furnace mill 
(minimill) can be  built for less than $300 to $400 per ton of annual  capacity, 
whi  1  e an integrated mi 11  requires $2,000 per ton of annual  capaci  ty  (see 
Iverson 119841;  and American Iron and Steel  Institute C1985, p. 241). 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper
Best available copyConstruction of  a minimill takes one  to two years,  while construction of  an 
integrated mill takes  five to  seven  years. 
Minimill producers  adapt faster to technological  breakthroughs  than 
integrated producers do.  Minimills were  quick to  make  use  of  the electric 
furnace and  to  implement  furnace improvements  and  continuous casting.  For 
example,  by 1978  only 11  percent of  steel produced  by  integrated mills was 
continuously  cast,  while 51  percent of  minimills' steel  was  continuously  cast 
(see  Congress  of the United States,  Office of  Technology  Assessment  C1980,  p. 
290,  table 1181).  The  first  on-line continuous  casting machinery  was  employed 
by a  minimill (see Kobrin,  C1967,  p.721). 
Approximately  25  percent of  total minimill capacity is located in the 
North Central  census  region,  7 percent in the East North Central  area,  over 50 
percent of the total capacity is  concentrated in  the South,  and  10 percent  is 
distributed in the West.  (These  figures are calculated from table 2.)  The 
interstate comparison  suggests  that minimills are able  to  compete  in  areas 
where  traditional  integrated facilities are established,  such  as  the MWC 
region.  In  addition,  minimills are located in  areas  that are sparsely 
populated by corporate facilities,  thereby developing new  local markets,  such 
as  the West  and  the South. 
# 
The  minimills rely on  speed  and  flexibility in  serving local markets. 
They  are able to fill small  steel orders at competitive prices and  to  offer 
shorter delivery times  than many  larger  steel  service centers.  Closeness  to 
the consumer  cuts costs of maintaining large inventories and reduces 
transportation costs.  Immediate  reaction to  new  orders minimizes  lead time 
and  levels of  product  inventory. 
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The  engineering survey  in  section I11  suggests  that minimill technology 
allows more  efficient production of steel  than the technology of  the 
integrated mill.  In  section IV,  the superior efficiency of small-firm 
operation is  addressed. 
In  this century,  small  family-controlled firms have  gradually changed  into 
large corporations  with administrative pyramids. 
The  Marshallian capitalist ruled his factory from an  office on  the 
second  floor.  At the turn of the century,  the president of a large 
national corporation was  lodged  in the higher building,  perhaps on  the 
seventh  floor,  with greater perspective and  power.  In today's giant 
corporation,  managers  rule from the top of skyscrapers;  on a clear day, 
they can  almost  see  the world.  Steven  Hymer  (1972,  pp.113-140). 
During the  last two decades,  the steel  industry has  experienced the 
reverse of  this process.  In  the nineteenth century,  steel production was 
concentrated  in  the hands  of  a few corporations,  but in  the last two  decades, 
these  corporations  started to  lose business  to smaller producers and  to 
imported  goods.  The  steel  industry,  therefore,  provides  a natural  experiment 
that can  help economists  analyze  the performance  of large corporations 
relative to  that of small  firms in  the same  market. 
To  explain the differences between  the minimill producers and  the 
integrated producers,  it  is  useful  to  think of the differences between 
Marshallian and  corporate firms.  Minimills are referred to  in the economic 
literature as  competitive sector.  Some  analysts  consider  imported  steel  as  a 
competitive sector,  too,  because  prices of  minimills and  imported  steel  are 
sensitive to  demand  conditions.  Vertically integrated mills are referred  to 
in the economic  literature as  the corporate steel  sector.  Prices of  corporate 
mill products  are less sensitive to demand  conditions and  are mostly 
determined by the price of labor and  materials.  In this section,  a 
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empirical  verification are presented. 
A Marshallian (competitive)  firm is a price-taker.  If demand  increases, 
it  is the customer,  not the producer,  who  dictates price change  through  the 
wholesaler  (who  would offer higher prices to  obtain the good).  If demand 
falls,  the wholesaler must  accept  lower prices and  impose  the new  price on  the 
producer.  An  increase in  demand  would  not be  allowed to  remain unsatisfied. 
The  fear of  financial  loss and  business  failure is the incentive for a  firm to 
respond  to  price changes.  In  the competitive market,  supply and  demand  are 
equated by  the price change. 
In the corporate market,  the manufacturer  influences  the price.  In  the 
corporation,  prices are set by administrative  action;  this price mechanism  is 
much  less flexible than the competitive market's.  An  inefficiently  managed 
branch of the company  does  not necessarily face extinction,  as  it  would  in  a 
Marshallian firm.  Such  a branch can  be  subsidized by  other branches. 
The  competitive market was  coined by  Gardiner Means  as  the competitive 
flexprice market operation,  where  supply and  demand  are brought  into 
equilibrium by  a flexible price.  In  a corporate fixprice market,  supply and 
demand  are equated  at an  inflexible price through the principle of  effective 
demand  (see  Gardiner Means  C19391). 
To  verify whether  corporate prices are insensitive to  variations  in 
demand,  as  the above  discussion suggests,  and  that they are  determined by  the 
factor costs,  economists have  analyzed  the formation of  prices in large 
bureaucratic firms.'  In  addition,  they have  analyzed price variations  in 
markets with a dominant  share of  corporate firms.  By  studying the behavior 
of  big corporations,  the author found  that there is  a desire to  stabilize 
prices and  to  target market  share.  The  oligopolistic firm does  not use 
marginal  principles  in  setting prices. 
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hypothesis.  Eichner  (1976)  and  Wood  (1974)  argue  that the firm  chooses  a 
markup  that will yield the required  level of retained earnings,  given its 
dividend-payout ratio and  debt-to-equity ratio.  The  pricing behavior of  a 
firm  in  the corporate market,  therefore,  is  determined by  the need  of  funds 
for internal  investment  rather than by  the change  in the demand  for product. 
This  argument,  based on  the analysis of the firm structure,  is supported by 
econometric  studies  that found  cost factors to  be  much  more  important than 
demand  factors." 
The  fixprice behavior of large firms  is  deeply  rooted  in the steel 
industry.  Yamawaki  (1985)  has  analyzed  the investment  behavior  of  the 
dominant  and  competitive fringe firms in  the steel  industry from 1907  to 
1930.  The  U.S.  Steel  Corporation represented  such  a dominant  firm.  Its share 
in  total U.S.  ingot capacity was  50.1  percent in  1908,  while Jones  and 
Laughlin,  then the second-largest producer,  had  only 4.2  percent of  total 
capacity.  In  the observed period,  Yamawaki  found  that the price variable had 
a statistically significant effect on  investment  decisions among  competitive 
firms,  but price was  not significant  in  influencing investment decisions  in 
the dominant  firm.  The  industry demand  variable did not have  a statistically 
significant relationship with the investment decision of the dominant  firm, 
while it  had  a significant effect on  the capital  level  in  the competitive firm. 
An  econometric  study of the price mechanism  in  the U.S.  corporate steel 
industry was  done  by  Acs  (1984)  for 1956  to  1975.  The  author's  conclusion is 
similar to that of  earlier study of  corporate firm  behavior,  in  which  the 
price-setting  mechanism was  inflexible.  During the observed period,  the steel 
industry was  dominated  by corporate firms.  Acs  (1984,  p.  54)  describes  the 
difference between  two  types of  firms:  "Once  production has  taken place, 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper
Best available copyprices have  no relationship to costs in  competitive markets.  In  corporate 
markets,  it  is  precisely the opposite.  Once  production  takes place,  demand 
has  no  impact on price." 
Acs  found that in  the 1974-75 recession,  steel 'mill prices did not rise 
during the boom  and  fell only slightly during the decline,  while prices of 
minimills and  imported  steel  rose in  the expansion  and  fell significantly in 
the decline.  The  same  findings were  confirmed by  the Council  on Wage  and 
Price Stability (1977). 
According to  Acs,  by maintaining a constant dividend-to-payout ratio, 
steel  corporations  have  provided a fertile climate for wage  increases during 
most  of  this century.  In the  last two decades,  the emergence  of  a competitive 
sector  in  the steel  industry has  forced corporations  either to lower  their 
prices or  to exit from the competitive end of steel  products.  Because  of 
concessions  to  organized labor,  corporations are not abie to  lower  wages  when 
the competitive market  requires it.  The  organizational  structure of the 
corporate sector,  which developed  in  the atmosphere  of  an  oligopolistic 
market,  has  a natural  resistance  to  reorganization.  Lower  entry barriers, 
through lower  sunk  cost,  determines  minimi,llsl  entrance  into the limited 
number  of  carbon-steel producers.  In  this range of  products,  superior 
technological  efficiency and  a flexible price adjustment mechanism  enable 
minimills to  force integrated producers  out of the market. 
5 
V.  A Measure  of Interregional and  Intertemporal  Efficiency Differences 
A  comparison  of the productivity of  integrated mills and  minimills would 
require time-series data on  the firm  level,  but,  unfortunately,  none  are 
available.  In lieu of  the firm-level data,  state census  data are used  here. 
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the other,  minimills. 
The  MWC  region represents  a set of states where  big corporations dominate 
steel  production.  Although minimills exist in  this area,  their percentage  in 
total capacity of  MWC  by 1982  was  less than 3  percent  (calculated from table 
2).  States  where  minimills were  in  the majority among  steel  producers  by 1982 
are selected as  representative of  minimills (these  states are selected from 
table 2).  Some  of these  states were  excluded from the analysis,  because  data 
are not reported (for disclosure reasons)  by the Census  of  Manufactures.  The 
remaining  states are aggregated and  termed  as  competitive  states."  There 
were  integrated mills in some  of the competitive states during the observed 
1963-82  period,  but their share was  declining,  while the share of  minimills 
was  increasing.  Under  this condition,  the change  in  the state figures 
reflects differences between  minimills and  integrated mills. 
The  analysis of the efficiency of  MWC  steel producers relative to  the 
competitive states' producers  is  performed by utilizing the total factor 
productivity (TFP)  framework.  Labor  productivity,  a term used frequently in 
the media,  does  not reflect efficiency of labor.  Similarly,  the ratio of 
output per  any  single factor,  which  forms  the "partial"  productivity index, 
cannot adequately measure  factor  efficiency.  Output per worker may  rise,  for 
example,  even  in  the absence  of  any  change  in workers'  efficiency if labor  is 
equipped with more  means  of  production.  The  question of labor efficiency is 
of  major  importance,  especially if different organizations,  such  as  corporate 
and  competitive firms,  are being analyzed.  The  rise in  output per worker-hour 
productivity is the composite effect of  changing labor,  capital,  and  other 
materials' efficiency,  as  well as  capital-labor substitution.  If the 
efficiency  of  each  factor remains  unchanged,  and if  capital  is substituted for 
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with a rise of output per unit of labor.  Each  factor's partial productivity 
can  be  weighted by  its relative importance,  as  indicated by  factor shares  in 
total output.  This  weighted average  is TFP,  which  would  show  changes  in 
efficiency,  free of changes  in  factor proportions.  For  a more  detailed 
definition of TFP,  see  appendix  11. 
Economists  are interested in  measuring  the change  in  efficiency of an 
industry from one  year  to  another  or,  more  recently,  from one  region to 
another.  The  TFP  measure  of  efficiency is the difference between observed 
output,  and  output that would  be  produced by  the  technology of the previous 
year  (or another  region).  By  assigning an  arbitrary level  to  TFP  at the 
reference year  (region),  TFP  for each  year  can  be  computed  from the  series of 
TFP  changes.  The  relative TFP  change  is  denoted  as  A".  For more  details on 
the A"  derivation,  see  appendix  11. 
Let us  denote  output as  V.  Then  the partial productivity index of labor 
is  VIL,  and  the partial productivity index of  capital  is  VIK,  where  L  and  K 
are physical  amounts  of labor and  capital.  The  proportional  change  in time of 
0 
these partial productivities,  correspondingly,  are  (VIL) =  V
O 
-  Lo  and 
0 
(V/K> =  V
O  -  KO,  where  (.  ">  denotes  proportional  change  in  time. ' 
Weighted  sums  of the changes  in  partial productivities amount  to  a 
proportional  change  of  TFP  : 
(1)  A"  =  sK(VO - KO)  +  sL(VO -  Lo), 
where  s  is  a  factor proportion in  output. 
The  industry's output is  measured  as  the deflated value added.  This 
approach is  used  by many  economists  who  measure  regional  TFP,  due  to the lack 
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from the Census  of  Manufactures.  The  discrete analog of continuous  time 
derivatives is the logarithmic differences between  two periods  (regions), 
according  to  the Tornqui  st approximation. "hares of factor inputs are  the 
arithmetic average  of  shares  between  two periods.  In this setting,  A"  is 
calculated as: 
Equation  (2)  indicates how  much  extra output is  produced  in  period,  t, 
relative to (t-l),  accounting for differences in  factor inputs. If  one 
substitutes region i,  instead of t, and  region j, instead of t-1,  then A" 
measures  the differences  in  efficiency of production in  region i relative to 
region j: 
VI.  Productivity Analysis 
The  efficiency measures  of  MWC  and  competitive  states are presented below, 
based  on  the methodology  described  in  section V.  Data analysis of  this 
section is  based  on  the Census  data and  on  the estimation of  capital for  the 
steel  producers  in  each  region,  which  is  described  in  appendix I. Capital 
data were  available from 1958.  As  a result,  TFP  for the MWC  region is 
measured  for the period 1958-82,  for each  "Census" year.  For  competitive 
states,  census  data are available after 1967,  because  for earlier years,  the 
amount of steel produced by  this region was  too small  to  report. 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper
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MWC  Steel  Producers  Rates  of Change  (Percentage  Change)" 
1 =2+3  2  3 
TFP  Capital  contribution  Labor  contribution 
Period  change  in TFP  change  in  TFP  change 
a.  In  this and  following tables,  the  sum  of components  might not be  equal  to 
the total, due  to  rounding. 
In  MWC,  efficiency of  production has  been  declining since 1967.  (See 
table 3,  column  1).  This decline was  mostly due  to  the decline  in  capital 
productivity up  to  the fourth period,  1972  to 1977.  In the fourth period,  the 
labor productivity decline contributed 2.2  percent  to  the TFP  decline.  In  the 
last period,  1977  to  1982,  the nature of the TFP  decline was  markedly 
different from previous periods because more  than half of the decline was  due 
to  the drop  in  labor productivity.  During this period,  steel  producers 
experienced profound changes.  Their output (in value-added  terms)  declined by 
75  percent,  while labor decreased  by only 43  percent.  Thus,  labor 
productivity during this period decreased by  a staggering 31  percent (see 
table 4).  It  is interesting to  note that labor productivity was  only slightly 
affected by  the change  in  the capital-to-labor ratio.  Change  in  capital 
intensity raised labor productivity in  all periods,  which  is  reflected by  the 
positive numbers  in  column  2 of table 4. 
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in  the MWC Region 
1  2=3+4  3  4 
Change in  Change in  labor  Change in capital  T F  P 
Period  output  productivity  intensity  change 
Based on table 4,  one can observe two long-term trends in labor 
productivity.  From 1954 to 1967, labor productivity grew when output rose. 
From 1967 to 1982, labor productivity declined, along with output, at the 
points of observation.  This suggests that in the face of declining demand, 
corporations do  not respond rapidly enough with reduction of  labor force to 
prevent a drop in labor productivity.  This is especially evident in the 
1977-82 period, when output declined by 74 percent, and labor productivity 
fell  by 32 percent. 
Productivity measures for steel  producers in competitive states are 
presented for 1967-72, 1972-77, and 1977-82.  (The  presence of  minimills 
earlier in those states was negligible, and data, in most cases, were not 
reported by the Census of Manufactures.)  In each competitive state, the 
number of minimills increased during these three periods and, therefore,  the 
observed rates of  change reflect the efficiency of minimills. 
Labor productivity fell  in competitive states by 4  percent during the 
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productivity decline in  competitive  states was  faster than labor productivity 
decline  in  MWC  states for these  two periods. 
Table  5  Sources of Labor  Productivity Change  in  Competitive  States 
1  2=3+4  3  4 
Change  in  Change  in  Change  in  capital  T  F  P 
Per i  od  V A  labor productivity  intensity  change 
Labor  productivity of  competitive  states,  similar to  that of  MWC  states, 
was  positively affected by  the change  in  capital  intensity (see  table 5, 
col  umn  3) . 
Differences  in labor productivity and  TFP  between  competitive  and MWC 
states are summarized  in  table 6.  In  1967-72  and  in  1972-77,  average  labor 
productivity and  TFP  in  competitive  states are lower  than in  MWC. 
Table  6  Competitive State Productivity Differences Relative to  MWC
a 
1 =2+3  2  3  4 
Labor  Capital  TFP  Output  change 
Period  productivity  intensity  chanqe  differences 
a.  A  negative sign indicates that productivity (intensity,  output)  in 
competitive  states is lower than  in  MWC  states.  A  positive sign indicates  the 
oppos i  te. 
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of table 6) is due primarily to more intense use of  capital  per worker in MWC 
states  (see  column 2 of  table 6).  A  tremendous labor productivity gain in 
competitive versus MWC states from 1977 to 1982, coincides with a reduction in 
output of MWC producers.  Output in MWC states has declined 71.7 percent 
faster than output in competitive states during this period.  The reduction in 
output was not sufficiently matched with reduction in labor among MWC 
producers.  It is important to note that in spite of labor productivity 
differences, TFP between two sets of  states was very stable for all  three 
periods.  This difference ranges between 6.9  percent and 7.7 percent.  This 
result indicates that if  the level of input factors were the same in  both 
regions, then output in MWC would be around 7 percent higher than output among 
competitive states, under the assumptions of  Hicks-neutrality.  It is 
interesting to note that our results are similar to those of H-S, who  found no 
significant change in TFP differences  between the Snowbelt and the Sunbelt, 
and to  those of Denny, Fuss, and May (1981), who  found  no significant change 
in TFP differences among six Canadian regions. 
Engineering surveys suggest that the production process used  in minimills 
is more efficient than the production process of analogous goods in the 
integrated mills.  Integrated mill  shutdowns and minimill openings in the same 
area  (such  as Ohio),  again, suggest the superior efficiency of minimills. 
However, our  findings, that efficiency of and labor productivity of 
competitive firms are not greater than or increasing faster than efficiency 
and labor productivity of  corporate firms in either 1967-72 or 1972-77, 
contradict that argument. 
This controversy might be caused by the problem of aggregation.  Minimills 
produce lower-grade products, and production of  these products by integrated 
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data,  output of  both minimills and  integrated mills were  aggregated into  one 
product (blast furnaces,  steelworks,  and  rolling and  finishing mills (Standard 
Industrial Classification Code--SIC--331). 
The  difference  in  efficiency between  the MWC  states and  competitive  states 
can be  explained in  the following way.  Integrated mills are changing  their 
product mix  by decreasing the share of low-grade products  (see  table 7).  For 
the low-grade products,  minimills can  be  more  efficient than integrated mills, 
but this superior efficiency cannot be  observed because  of  the aggregation 
problem.  During the 1967-77  period,  MWC  states gained  greater efficiency by 
changing  their product mix  than competitive  states gained by adopting 
minimills,  which  suggests  that the production of  low-grade products is less 
efficient than the total production process  in  MWC.  From  1977  to  1982,  due  to 
a  sharp decline in  demand  for the integrated mills' product,  competitive 
states became  more  efficient than MWC  states. 
To  summarize:  during the observed period,  1967  to 1982,  the difference  in 
efficiency  between MWC  and  competitive states  is fairly stable (table 6,  third 
column).  Competitive  states,  relative to  corporate producers,  expanded  their 
output (table 6,  last column)  as  well  as  product mix  (table 7).  which  is 
especially evident from 1977  to 1982. 
This analysis of  steel  producers  indicates  that,  contrary to  the H-S 
assertion,  equal  rates of  change of TFP  among  the Snowbelt  and  Sunbelt 
producers  do not necessarily rule out the possibility of  a  competitive 
di  sadvantage of  one  region relative to  another. '  H-S  data were  aggregated 
to the entire manufacturing  sector,  which makes  one  even  more  hesitant about 
H-S  conclusions.  A  region that is  at  a  competitive disadvantage,  while losing 
its  production share,  may  repeatedly change  its product mix  to  sustain TFP 
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Table 7  USA  Minimill Share  of Total USA  Production 
(Percent  of Total  Tonnage) 
Wire  rod  20%  7 0%  90% 
Re bar  5  0  80  100 
Light shapes  5  0  80  100 
H.R.  bar-merchant  10  50  7  5 
H.R.  bar-special  5  15  5  0 
Medium  structurals  5  7  0  8  5 
SOURCE:  Marcus  and  Kirsis (19851. 
VII.  Conclusion 
From  a historical point of  view,  the steel  industry has  gone  through a 
major reform since the late 1950s.  This reform,  the birth of  a  competitive 
sector,  was  instigated by  the development  of the electric-arc furnace and  easy 
access  to  scrap metals.  Technological  changes  led to a  new  form of 
administrative organization in the steel  industry and to a new  regional 
distribution of steel  producers.  The  distribution of minimills is  fairly even 
in  the country,  while corporate producers are concentrated  in  MWC  region.  In 
the future,  the share of  minimills is  expected  to  increase,  creating even 
further decentralization of  steel  producers. 
A very significant change  among  MWC  producers  took place in the 1977  to 
1982  period.  The  value added  in  this region fell by 75  percent during this 
period.  The  decline  in  demand  for  corporate producers  was  not matched  with a 
decline in  labor,  and  labor productivity fell by 31  percent.  In  the future, 
corporate producers  will have  to  either shrink their facilities and  labor 
force further, or lower  their prices and  regain the lost share of the market. 
The  first  option seems  to  be  more  appealing. 
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firms.  Nevertheless, states where competitive firms  affect  steel-producing 
performance did not exhibit superior performance relative to MWC producers. 
Therefore, similar rates of change or levels of TFP do  not necessarily mean 
that there is no more deterioration in one region than another.  In other 
words, competitive disadvantage of the region cannot be determined only by the 
aggregated measure of productivity,  as H-S implied.  In the MWC, steel 
producers are losing their market to  other states, most likely as a result of 
being less efficient in the low-grade products.  As a result, the changing 
product mix of  MWC producers is keeping their TFP on a level  higher than that 
of competitive states. 
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Description of  Data 
Output.  Output is represented by  value added  in  constant dollars. 
Regional  time series for value added  were  derived from Census  of Manufactures 
for the Census  years for 1957  to  1982.  Regional  output deflators for the 
steel products were  not available;  therefore,  a national  deflator for Total 
Steel  Mill Products  (SIC=331,  reported by Bureau of  Labor  Statistics)  was  used. 
Labor.  The  Census  of  Manufactures reports data on  salaries for 
nonproductive  workers  and  wages  on productive workers,  and  productive workers' 
hours  and  nonproductive employees  (but no nonproductive hours).  For  the 
analysis,  the nonproductive workers'  contributions were  expressed in  hours. 
For  that purpose,  the number  of  nonproductive employees  was  multiplied by 
2,080,  the hours  worked  during the year,  assuming  a 40-hour  workweek. 
The  change  in  labor contribution was  presented  by  the Divisia index of 
productive and  nonproductive workers: 
where 
v, =  .5Cv,(t> +  v,(t-l>l,  and  - 
v, =  (w:L'>/Cw,  L' 
i =  type of  employee  (productive,  nonproductive),  and 
w, =  wages  or salaries. 
Capital.  Capital  is estimated with a well-established,  value-added 
approach.  According  to  this approach,  cost of  capital  (Ck)  is  derived as  a 
difference  between  value added  and  payroll  (both  variables are reported by  the 
Census  of Manufactures).  Such  a cost of  capital  includes much  more  than  the 
cost of reproducible capital.  It includes  cost of land,  value of  services, 
cost of  working capital,  etc.  The  estimate of  cost of  reproducible capital  is 
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avai  1  able. 
Capital  is calculated as  a ratio  of  capital  cost to  rental price of 
capital  (Pk): 
K  =  Ck/Pk  . 
Values  for P,  for each  state were  computed  according to the Jorgenson 
approach.  Calculation and  data sources for this approach  are described  in 
Garofalo and Malhotra (1985).  Since rental price of capital varies from state 
to  state,  capital for aggregated regions (such  as  MWC)  is  calculated as  sum  of 
quantities of  capital  in  each  state: 
K1  =  c(C:/P:),  where  region I  consists of states,  s. 
S 
Price of  capital, P
k,  reflects variation in tax rates over  states,  but it 
does  not reflect dynamics  of the rate of  return specific to the industry.  On 
the other hand,  the American  Productivity Center  has  computed  capital stock 
for the industry.  Based  on  this stock value,  rental price of capital 
(Pk)  was  computed  for the nation.  The  ratio  of P,  and  Pk  is used 
to  adjust rental prices of capital.  Capital  stock for each  region was 
computed  as: 
K'  =  (P,/P:>  z(C:/P:). 
S 
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We  assume  the Hicks-neutral production function--that is, output 
attainable from each  input,  rise, or decline is stipulated by the unchanged 
marginal  rates of substitution.  In  the Hicks-neutral production function, 
factors are assumed  to  be  paid the value of  their marginal  product.  The  major 
purpose  is to  identify the  shift of the production function,  which means 
increase  (decrease)  of production of  output having input levels fixed.  In 
reality,  though,  the shift of  production function and  change  in  input 
quantities take place at the same  time.  The  share-weighted sum  of  input 
growth rates describes  the shift along the production function.  The  residual 
output change  represents  the shift of  production function  that is called TFP. 
Due  to  the data availability constraint,  value added  is  used  as  a measure 
of  output.  This  imposes  a weak  separability assumption  between  value added 
and  intermediate goods  and  energy.  Our  production function is: 
(1)  Vt  =  F  (At,  Kt,  Lt). 
Logarithmic differentiation of  this function provides 
(2) Vot =  S:  KOt  +  SA  L
o
t +  Aot, 
where 
Sk +  St,  =  1, 
assuming  that the marginal  product of each  input is  equal  to  its  price.  In 
the following,  time subscript will be  omitted for convenience.''  A"  is 
calculated as  a residual  in (2).  Thus,  besides  technological  change,  it 
includes measurement  errors and  errors that emanated  from the restrictiveness 
of  the assumptions,  such  as  constant returns to scale,  weak  separability, or 
neutrality. 
Based  on  (2>, one  can  view change  in  labor productivity (VO -  Lo) as  a 
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(3)  V
O  -  Lo =  Sk  KO  +  (St,-1)  +A
0 
=  SK  (KO  -  LO)  +  AO, 
where 
KO  -  Lo is a change  of capital-to-labor ratio or capital  intensity. 
A"  can  be  expressed,  based  on  (2), as  a weighted sum  of capital and  labor 
productivity changes. 
A0  =  (Sr  +  St.) V0 - Sk  KO  -  SL  Lo =  Sk  (VO-KO)  +  SI  (VO-Lo), 
where 
V
O  -  KO  is  capital  changes,  and  V
O  -  Lo is labor productivity changes. 
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Minimill Data 
The  Mini-mill Handbook.  33  Metal  Producing,  New  York,  NY:  McGraw  Hill, 
1983,  pp.  6-17. 
Marketing Economics:  Key  Plants  1984-1985.  New  York,  NY:  Marketing 
Economics  Institute,  p.  205. 
Iron and  Steel  Works  of the  World,  1983,  8th Edition. Richard Serjeantson 
et al.,  eds.,  Surrey,  England:  Metal  Bulletin Books,  1983. 
Integrated Mill Data 
The  Changing  Structure of the U.S.  Economy:  Lessons  from the Steel 
Industry.  New  York,  NY:  Praeger,  1984. 
NOTE:  Data  for 13  minimills that did not appear  in  The  Minimill Handbook, 
were  supplemented  by  phone  interviews. 
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1.  In  spite of the high concentration of the integrated facilities in  MWC, 
this area attracted as  much  as  15  percent of the total minimill capacity. 
2.  Dirlam et al. (1955)  examined  price formation in large bureaucratic firms, 
such  as  Exxon,  U.S.  Steel,  and General  Motors. 
3.  For  a comprehensive  discussion of  the subject,  see  Federal  Reserve  System 
and  the Social  Science  Research  Council  (1972). 
4.  Eckstein and  Fromin  (1959),  based  on  the U.S.  data,  found  that standard 
unit labor costs and  material prices were  important on  the cost side;  on  the 
demand  side,  capacity utilization and  the ratio  of unfilled orders  to  sales, 
which represents demand,  were  insignificant.  Godley  and  Nordhaus  (1973) 
found,  based on  the United Kingdom data,  that the normal  price hypothesis  is 
sound,  and  prices do not respond  to short-run changes  in  demand.  Coutts,  et 
al. (1978)  found,  "  The  normal  price hypothesis  is that the markup  of  price 
over normal  cost is independent of the conditions of demand  of both product 
and  factor markets." 
5.  The  discussion of this phenomenon  is presented  in section VI. 
6.  These  states are New  Jersey,  Minnesota,  Tennessee,  Mississippi,  Georgia, 
California,  Washington,  Arkansas,  Texas,  Oklahoma,  and  Louisiana. 
7.  Proportional  change  in labor,  for example,  is its time derivative 
dL .  1 =  dlnL  - - - 
divided by  its value:  dt  L  dt , 
therefore: 
O  dln(V/L>  =  -  dlnL =  .=. 
(V/L> =  dt  d  t  d  t  V-L 
8.  For  a good  discussion of this topic,  see  Cowing  et al.  (1981) 
9.  A note on  the capital measure  is  due.  The  rate of  return on  capital was 
adopted from the national  data,  which are  the major components  in  the 
calculation of  rental prices of  capital  services.  From  1977  to  1982,  major 
corporations in  MWC  had  a significant reduction in  rates of  return.  These 
rates basically determine  national figures.  Thus,  the estimated amount of 
capital for competitive  states was,  most  likely, grossly overestimated. 
Therefore,  TFP  change  is  probably underestimated  for competitive  states for 
the 1977  to  1982  period. 
10.  That  is, large MWC  steel  corporations  are losing their business to small 
competitive steel  producers,  but that does  not affect a TFP  change. 
11.  For  a critical evaluation of this approach,  see  Norsworthy  and  Malmquist 
(1  984). 
12.  For  detailed derivation,  see  Gollop and  Roberts  (1982),  or Israilevich 
(1985). 
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